As a member of the Commonwealth, South Africa aligned its defence policy closely with that of Great Britain in the years between the two World Wars. Apart from taking responsibility for its own defence, the Union of South Africa was also expected, at its discretion, to support Britain in the case of a European war. By the mid-1930s South Africa faced a possible external threat as the aggressive, imperialist policies of Germany, Italy and Japan began to take shape. South African Defence Minister, Oswald Pirow, endeavoured to obtain 15-inch guns from Britain to bolster Cape Town's defences against sea-raiders. Despite her strategic interest in safeguarding the Cape sea route, Britain's own efforts at rearmament, however, made her unwilling to part with guns of that calibre. Instead, in June 1936, the British government agreed to lend the monitor HMS Erebus, carrying two 15-inch guns, to the Union of South Africa. Redesignated Erebus Heavy Battery, South African Garrison Artillery, it was to serve as a floating artillery battery in Cape Town harbour. Two detachments of South Africans were trained in Britain to man the Erebus, but war broke out before the Erebus could sail for the Cape. Some of the South African crew on the Erebus allegedly 'refused duty' and were put ashore. The Erebus scheme was subsequently cancelled and the South Africans sent home. The aim of this article is to determine the origins of the Erebus scheme and the reasons for its demise against the background of Anglo-South African relations immediately before and after the commencement of the Second World War. This entails an investigation of Anglo-South African relations both at interstate and popular level. The article outlines the birth of the scheme amidst the diverging views of the British Admiralty and the South African Minister for Defence, Oswald Pirow, on Cape Town's defence needs. It highlights the political division in South African society over participation in a 'British' war on the eve of the Second World War and investigates the relationship between the South Africans and Britons on the Erebus. It concludes with a brief assessment of the role of the removal of some of the South
Introduction
By the end of the nineteenth century, British imperial federation, as Wilcox observes, was 'a powerful dream'. Imperialists had a vision that selfgoverning British colonies in northern America, Australia and southern Africa would become nations within the empire and "commit themselves to joining the imperial metropole in developing and defending the empire's vast Asian and African estates". 1 When Commonwealth troops were employed for the first time in a British war, the Second Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902, 2 it was neither in defence of the empire, nor for their military contribution; it was for political reasons to "impress all foreign nations" and to draw the colonies "closer to the mother Country by creating a new bond of union between all parts of our Empire". 3 This notion of accepting military contributions from the Commonwealth merely for political propaganda evaporated soon after the Anglo-Boer War. During the First World War Britain relied on India, South Africa, Canada, Australia and New Zealand to augment her forces. 4 By 1921 British military commitments across the globe were seriously overextending Britain's financial and human resources. Britain subsequently alleviated her burden by delegating some of her military responsibilities to the dominions, who were not only expected to take primary responsibility for their own defence, but also, at their discretion, for colonial policing and support (expeditionary forces) to Britain in the case of a European war. 5 The dominions in turn, would enjoy British support in terms of equipment and training, and, most importantly, in the protection of the Royal Navy. The ideal of military cooperation in the Commonwealth had changed dramatically from merely fostering internal cohesion and demonstrating a united front to Britain's rivalries by the end of the nineteenth century, to a quest for optimal pooling of military resources by the first half of the twentieth century. The prerequisite for military cooperation in the Commonwealth, however, remained the same: sound Anglo-dominions relations with due consideration for the security interests of the individual dominions. As Kitchen observes, nationalism was on the rise within the British Empire and "Britain needed the Empire more than the Empire needed Britain". 6 It was against this background of defence cooperation for mutual security that the South African government in 1936 accepted, on loan, the British monitor HMS Erebus to bolster the defences of Cape Town. Two detachments of South Africans were recruited and then trained in the United Kingdom to man the Erebus, but war broke out before the Erebus could sail for the Cape. Some of the South African crew on the Erebus allegedly 'refused duty' and were put ashore. The new South African Prime Minister, General J.C. Smuts, subsequently cancelled the Erebus scheme and the South African crew returned to the Union.
The aim of this article is to determine the origins of the Erebus scheme and the reasons for its demise against the background of Anglo-South African relations immediately before and after the commencement of the Second World War. This entails an investigation of Anglo-South African relations both at interstate and popular level. The article outlines the birth of the scheme amidst the diverging views of the British Admiralty and the South African Minister for Defence, Oswald Pirow, on Cape Town's defence needs. It highlights the political division in South African society over participation in a 'British' war on the eve of the Second World War and investigates the relationship between the South Africans and Britons on the Erebus. It concludes with an analysis of the role of the removal of some of the South African crew from the Erebus and the change of government in South Africa in the cancellation of the Erebus scheme.
Oswald Pirow and the origin of the Erebus scheme
The defence policy that Oswald Pirow inherited when he became Minister for Defence in the Hertzog Cabinet in 1933 had been worked out by the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1928. 7 However, the international politico-military 6.
M. Kitchen landscape had changed significantly by the early 1930s. An aggressive, expansionist Japan had overrun Manchuria and Adolf Hitler had come to power in Germany, vowing to redress the humiliation of Versailles. South Africa thus had to deal with the possibility of an external threat. In May 1934 Pirow announced a five-year defence plan, drafted by the Chief of the General Staff, Sir Pierre van Ryneveld, to meet the new challenges. This plan focussed mainly on expanding the army and air force, with no significant emphasis on coastal defences. Pirow was not too concerned about a large-scale threat from the sea and thought that some mobile artillery (6-inch guns) together with field batteries and other deterrents would be able to take care of the occasional surface-raider or submarine. 8 The possibility of an external threat against South Africa soon became more serious. Mussolini had led Italy into a war of conquest against Abyssinia in 1935 and Hitler, openly defying the Versailles restrictions, was rearming and expanding the German armed forces on a massive scale. Moreover, Germany had already commissioned three 'pocket' battleships by 1934, each boasting a main armament of six 11-inch guns, making them "potential sea-raiders of formidable power". 9 In the subsequent updating of South Africa's defence policy, Pirow paid special attention to coastal defence. The Union's coast defence policy assumed that the Royal Navy would command the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans in any conflict. South Africa thus only had to defend its ports against the odd raider that might slip through the British patrols.
10
Safeguarding South Africa's ports, particularly Cape Town and Simon's Town, was naturally also of great importance to Britain, as the Cape sea route was crucial in any war involving the closure of the Suez Canal.
11 As Hyam and Henshaw state, South Africa "stands at the intersection of major global sea-routes, providing a vital link in 'the routes to the east' -which is why the British went there in the first place -and it commands access to two oceans, the Atlantic and the Indian, with an unrivalled surveillance of both …".
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As far as the fixed coastal defences of the Union were concerned, Simon's Town enjoyed the first priority in terms of a 'gentleman's agreement' with Great Britain. However, in Pirow's mind, where the fear of an attack by Japan apparently loomed large, 13 Cape Town's fixed defences were uppermost. Whereas the 1928 policy made provision for safeguarding Cape Town against cruiser attack, Pirow aimed to make the city 'virtually battleship proof'. 14 To that end, the upgrading of Cape Town's main defences had to include the installation of a 15-inch gun battery on Robben Island and 9.2-inch high angle guns near Duiker Point as the city's main defences. 15 The Admiralty and the War Office, however, saw no need for 15-inch guns at the Cape. They were of the opinion that as far as could be foreseen, "the scale of attack at the Cape does not warrant any Coast Defence armament heavier than the modern 9.2-inch gun". 16 This opinion was based, firstly, on the assumption that under existing treaty arrangements no state had sufficient battleships to employ for its own purposes and it was therefore unlikely that any ships with guns larger than 8 inches would be detailed to execute raids at the Cape. Secondly, the Cape was so far removed from any likely enemy base that the 9.2-inch gun was a sufficient deterrent to even a heavily armoured battleship. A hit by a 9.2-inch shell could easily damage the enemy ship to the extent that it would make the long homeward voyage, with the risk of being attacked en route always present, an extremely difficult, if not impossible, undertaking. Thirdly, the intended use of In the end, South Africa never acquired a single 15-inch gun during the Second World War. By 1945, three 9.2-inch guns were deployed on Robben Island to bolster Cape Town's defences, while more guns of the same calibre were stationed at Scala Battery, Simon's Town and Apostle Battery, Llandudno, to form the main armament of the Cape Peninsula. The benefit of hindsight makes it is possible to argue that Pirow's insistence on 15-inch guns was, perhaps, not so farfetched. When Italy entered the war on 10 June 1940, the Mediterranean became so risky to Allied shipping, that large convoys of ships carrying men and war materials were diverted to the Cape sea route. Table Bay and other South African ports became an important strategic link in the Allied war effort. A large percentage of the convoys routed around the Cape had to refuel and replenish at the Cape, bringing, inter alia, some of Britain's largest ocean liners, adapted as troop-carriers, to anchor in Table Bay Continued Japanese penetration to the west, beyond Ceylon, could have exposed South African harbours to seaward attack and even sever the important Cape sea route.
36

Implementing the Erebus scheme
Given the additional cost and practical problems associated with operating the Erebus as a sea-going ship or anchoring her outside protective breakwaters, South Africa's defence planners decided to employ her as a floating artillery battery inside the Cape Town docks. 37 Smuts, who was not in favour of deploying the Erebus in Cape Town harbour, later ridiculed its deployment in the docks stating that firing its huge 15-inch guns "would not only cause great destruction in the docks themselves, but … would cause half of Cape Town to collapse".
38
In terms of the agreement with the British government, the Admiralty would train a detachment of South African gunnery personnel and such other technical personnel as could be provided before the departure of the Erebus from the United Kingdom. This personnel would return to the Union on the Erebus as part of her crew, thereby reducing the number of British personnel required and consequently also the cost to the Union. 39 An officer from the Royal Navy would command the Erebus until she was officially handed over to the South African government in Cape Town. naval ratings were to be recruited to fulfil certain naval services on the Erebus, the unit was organised entirely as an army unit and the naval personnel would all be attached to the artillery corps and wear army uniforms and ranks. The commander of the unit would be recruited from the Royal Naval Reserve, but commissioned as a major in the South African Artillery.
42
By 1 July 1939 the UDF had recruited a total of 25 ex-Royal Navy ratings in the Union to serve as seamen on the Erebus. Three officers were also recruited from the same source. These men were to be sent to the UK on refresher courses in time to return to South Africa on the Erebus. 43 In addition to these seamen, the When first interviewed by Lyon, the latter brought Finlayson under the impression that he was to retain his naval rank and would take command of the Erebus at Portsmouth to bring her out to South Africa. On learning that he would hold an army appointment and would be in command of the artillery battery only until the Erebus was handed over at the Cape, Finlayson appealed, through Lyon, to the Admiralty to retain his navy rank and be appointed captain of the ship with a view to taking her out to South Africa. His appeal was unsuccessful, since the Admiralty had already decided to appoint Cdr. I.W. Whitehorn 47 to command the Erebus on her voyage to South Africa. Whitehorn, recalled from the Royal Navy's retired list, had previous experience on HMS Terror, 48 sister ship of the Erebus.
Strained relations on board the Erebus
The legacy of colonial rule left the Union of South Africa ostensibly very British on the eve of the Second World War. The Union had inherited many of its socio-political and military structures from Britain and the Union still shared the British monarch as official head of state with the rest of the British Empire. The Union Jack was still one of the Union's national flags and God save the King was still sung as one of the national anthems. The equipment, uniforms, ranks, insignia, customs and traditions of the Union Defence Force were unmistakably British. English was, furthermore, apart from being one of the Union's two official languages (next to Afrikaans), the lingua franca of the Defence Force. 49 According to Stubbs,"the attitude taken up by some of the Royal Naval personnel of and below the equivalent rank of Chief Petty Officer was such that continual friction arose as they goaded the South African troops into a state of extreme dissatisfaction". 65 At the bottom of the conflict, Stubbs claimed, was the Royal Naval ratings' attitude that "the ship did not belong to the Union of South Africa and was a British man-of-war flying the British flag, and as such should only be manned by British sailors". 66 The South Africans for their part regarded the naval ratings as being "not up to the detachment type of man", if not "of a lower type" 67 and were not keen to mix with them socially. They did not like eating and sleeping with them and "segregated themselves from the remainder of the ship's company". 68 But though most of the South Africans were billeted in their own messes, the non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and some of the men were accommodated with the naval personnel in the same mess due to shortage of space on board. 69 The net result of it all was that, although they got along well enough to work together, there was no 'chumming up' between the predominantly Afrikaansspeaking gunners and the British sailors. 70 Though restricted to the predominantly Afrikaans-speaking Second Detachment, or some portion of it, Anglo-South African relations at rank-and-file level were thus somewhat less than satisfactory for cultural-political reasons.
Their unsatisfactory relationship with the Royal Navy ratings affected the morale of the First Detachment negatively, but was by no means the only factor in that regard. As artillerymen they felt somewhat awkward serving on a ship and they were, furthermore, not used to cleaning cabins and scrubbing bathrooms and toilets. To make it worse, there were not enough gunners to cope with all the work and some of the junior NCOs had to join in to get the work done. Though the South Africans, particularly the NCOs, did not like this, such duties were all in a days work for leading seaman, their peers in naval rank. 71 African citizens to render military service outside the borders of the Union. 80 According to Stubbs, the men "generally felt that their position on a British man-ofwar during war-time should be clarified as they were South Africans and at present on a ship of war outside South African waters. They would not volunteer for service here if asked to do so". 81 According to the Executive Officer of the Erebus, Lt. Cdr.
N.H. Whatley, Royal Navy, he "could sense that the South Africans were uneasy' and he found it necessary to inform Whitehorn that he was 'uneasy' in his mind 'as to the loyalty of the first S.A. detachment". 82 Britain's appeal to the dominions to "answer the call of collective security against Hitler's transgressions", 83 did not elicit the same response throughout the Commonwealth. The two homogeneous Anglocentric dominions, Australia and New Zealand, rallied to Britain's side immediately. 84 Australian prime minister, Sir
Robert Gordon Menzies declared war against Germany on 3 September 1939 "without debate in the parliament or recourse to cabinet". 85 The Australian parliament, when it met on 6 September, did not dispute the proposition that "the dominions were bound to follow the United Kingdom automatically in a state of war" at all. 86 Canada, with its unpredictable French-speaking minority, insisted on its right to debate the issue in the House of Commons first, but when the vote was taken a week later, it was almost unanimous for war. 87 When the issue of participation was brought before the House of Assembly in South Africa on 4 September, Smuts obtained the green light for the Union's entry into the war with a tiny majority of just 13 votes (80 to 67). 88 In 1939, the rift in South Africa's white community was as sharp as the parliamentary divide. English-speaking whites generally regarded it their duty to aid Britain, 89 while most of their Afrikaans-speaking compatriots were against participation, and "some even vociferously pro-Nazi". 90 Given the predominantly Afrikaans-speaking composition of the First Detachment, politics might certainly have played a role in the attitude of some detachment members. But, as Giliomee points out, "Afrikaners did not boycott the war as a group", and about half of the white South Africans that fought in the war were indeed Afrikaans-speaking, though many joined up for financial rather than idealistic reasons. 91 It is unclear exactly how many members of the artillerymen on the Erebus really opposed the war effort, but this matter will be raised later in this article.
The NCOs of the First Detachment later claimed that the South Africans would not have adopted this anti-war attitude, was it not for the conduct of the Royal Naval ratings on the Erebus. Some of the naval ratings who 'had been prominent in goading the South African personnel previously' now caused further tension by "calling them pro-Nazis and treating them accordingly, especially during meal hours when the South African personnel were together and conversed among themselves in Afrikaans". 92 Feelings were very 'intense' and 'a lot' of unfavourable remarks were made towards the First Detachment. They were "repeatedly … asked, sometimes in a nasty manner by lower ratings ashore and on the ship, what they as South Africans were doing on the ship", 93 since they were not fighting for the British. 94 The Regulating Petty Officer on board was allegedly particularly vindictive towards the First Detachment, inter alia remarking "these damn South Africans, they are a dirty lot, and I suppose they have a lot of bugs there in their bunks". 95 The Royal Navy ratings also 'passed a lot of remarks' on the Afrikaans language, such as referring to 'these foreigners who spoke foreign languages' and It was, however, not the Royal Navy ratings only that contributed to the tension between the artillerymen and the Royal Naval ratings. On 4 September one of the South African NCOs, Bdr. T.L. Dudley, after interpreting a German news broadcast on the radio for the Royal Naval ratings, purportedly stated: "You fellows do not understand Hitler. He is a damn good chap".
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Dudley was allegedly 'continually talking in a pro-German manner' and a few nights previously his proGerman statements had resulted in a scuffle with two naval ratings who nearly threw him overboard. Before that, he was also involved in a brawl in one of the public houses ashore one evening as a result of his pro-German remarks. The Executive Officer of the Erebus, Lt. Cdr. N.H. Whatley, Royal Navy, later reported that Dudley's conduct "annoyed the British part of the Ship's company and also most of the South African personnel". The mood on the Erebus improved markedly when it became known that Gen. J.C. Smuts had taken over with a new cabinet and that South Africa had declared war on Germany. But the criticism and remarks from the naval ratings did not stop entirely.
102 Furthermore, since they were on a British warship with no indication when the ship would leave, some of the South Africans were getting 'very restless', as the days passed, especially when "communications stopped from South Africa and we were getting no letters [from our families] or news". 103 By midSeptember they were very upset because the ship was not leaving for South Africa and there was no indication of what was going to happen to them. 104 The First
Detachment now allegedly "seemed to want to get off the ship at all costs". 105 They argued that they were not required to fight overseas according to South African defence policy and 'very' often stated "we have not got to fight outside the Union, and we won't fight". 106 Some of the unfavourable remarks and criticisms of the naval ratings might in fact have been uttered in response to this attitude amongst and statements by the South Africans.
107
The First Detachment put ashore
The news of Finlayson and Van der Hoven's unexpected and unexplained withdrawal to the Union increased the uncertainty and dissatisfaction of some of the artillerymen On 19 September the NCOs of the First Detachment requested to see Finlayson before he left the ship in order to clarify their position. Finlayson, accompanied by Stubbs, met with them that same morning. A total of three warrant officers and six NCOs attended the meeting. Only one of them was from the 102.
SANDFA, AG (2) predominantly English-speaking Second Detachment. 108 The NCOs tabled all the aforementioned grievances, i.e. the attitude of and verbal abuse by some of the Royal Naval ratings; the discontinuation of their special daily allowances; the uncertainty of their position on a British warship in terms of the South African Defence Act; and the uncertainty of the sailing date and destination of the Erebus.
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Two of the NCOs demanded to leave the ship and return to South Africa by mail steamer, as they did not want to fight on a British ship. 110 They did not 'refuse duty' as Du Toit claims, 111 but just demanded to leave the ship. 112 It is impossible, however, to determine exactly how many men shared this attitude. A 'large proportion' of the First Detachment allegedly "appeared to be satisfied and content to carry out their duties cheerfully" 113 and the Battery Sergeant-Major later testified that the grievances put forward by the NCOs were "not representative of the detachment".
114
Finlayson and Stubbs decided to report the matter to the commander of the Erebus, Cdr. I.W. Whitehorn, Royal Navy, and request him to accompany them to London the next morning to lay the matter before the High Commissioner. 115 According to his own evidence, Finlayson, who was on the point of sailing for South Africa, 116 adopted a rather passive attitude in the whole matter and allowed Stubbs to take the initiative. 117 At the meeting with Whitehorn, Stubbs stated "the first detachment of the Erebus Heavy Battery, although prepared at all times to carry out orders, now feel that in the circumstances they do not want to return to South Africa on H.M.S. Erebus, but wish to leave for South Africa in a liner as soon as possible". 120 Stubbs thus clearly created the impression that the entire detachment wanted to leave the Erebus, though, as indicated before, that was seemingly not the case. The officers and men of the Second Detachment had in the meantime distanced themselves from the desire to leave the ship. 
Cancellation of the Erebus scheme
Unknown to the men on the Erebus, the Admiralty was already in the process of trying to retrieve the vessel for its own purposes when matters were brought to a head on 19 September 1939. When the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, learned about the incident on the Erebus the next day, 20 September, he had already dispatched a telegram, "personal and private", 128 to the South African Prime Minister, Gen. J.C. Smuts, in which he informed him that the Erebus was ready to sail for Cape Town, but at the same time appealed to him that since "you are unlikely to have need of this ship … the Admiralty will be most grateful … if you can let us have her either by re-loan or re-transfer … [as] she would be most useful for various purposes in the shallows of the Belgian coast, especially if Holland were attacked". 129 He pointed out that the British government "never considered 15" guns necessary for defence of Cape Town, but to please Pirow agreed to loan Erebus until those defences were modernised in view of his fear of attack by Japan". 130 Churchill admitted that the defences of Cape Town 'remains weak', but, ignoring a possible Japanese threat, assured Smuts that should the German battle cruisers, the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau, the only possible threat to the Cape, break out and try to reach South African waters, the Royal Navy would mount a "major naval operation … [and] pursue them wherever they go with our most powerful vessels until they are hunted down". 131 Churchill fully realised that the 'question is mainly political' and added "rather than do anything to embarrass you we would do without the ship".
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Smuts immediately agreed to the retransfer of the Erebus to the Royal Navy. 133 He was not in favour of deploying the Erebus in Cape Town harbour since he considered the "Robben Island 15" scheme an extravagant over insurance". 134 The relationship between Churchill and Smuts was obviously better and more direct than that between Churchill and Pirow, which allowed for more realistic rather than diplomatic cooperation and decision-making. Smuts clearly based his decision on his honest assessment of the needs of the Union and those of the United Kingdom. 139 The whole incident had thus not yet been investigated when Smuts made his decision and it is therefore doubtful whether he had any knowledge of the event at that stage.
Once Smuts had agreed to release the Erebus for imperial use the Admiralty insisted that "the sooner those sulky South African artillerymen … are sent home the better". 140 The bulk of the South African detachments departed for the Union on the Windsor Castle on 12 October 1939. Erebus Heavy Battery was only disbanded on 1 April 1940 after all its personnel had been transferred to other units or suitably disposed of. 141 In the interest of good Anglo-South African relations, also in the public eye, Churchill asked Smuts whether he deemed a public announcement of the retransfer of the Erebus necessary and if so, how this should be done. 142 Smuts informed him that the appropriate course would be for the Admiralty to announce publicly that the Erebus had been re-transferred to the Admiralty at the latter's request and that suitable alternative arrangements were being made for the proper defence of Cape Town harbour. Smuts, of course, added that "a word of appreciation for our action will be much appreciated". 143 The Admiralty duly issued a statement for publication in the London press on 28 September 1939, following the recommendation by Smuts to the letter and concluding, as Smuts requested, with the comment that "the United Kingdom Government warmly appreciates the prompt response of the Union Government to the proposal put to them and their readiness to assist the Admiralty in this matter". 144 High Commissioner in London), whom he regarded as 'material witnesses'. The court of enquiry concluded that there was no threat of mutiny amongst the South Africans and that the unrest was not due to 'any organised political movement or activities'. 151 The court thus in effect found White was of the opinion that this 'unfortunate friction' between Finlayson and Whitehorn was 'the original reason for the subsequent' In the close confines of the ship it was inevitable that the bad feeling between the two senior officers was "sensed on the mess deck and would have contributed to any unrest existin". 160 It was thus, in his estimation, bad personal relations between the two senior officers that had caused the trouble and not any flaw in Anglo-South African relations at popular level.
White reckoned that the doubt about the Union's attitude towards the war played no part in the unrest amongst the South Africans, but conceded that there was "a certain amount of good natured chaffing … [and] banter peculiar to the naval mind which might not have been understood by the S.A. detachment". In his opinion the men were disturbed by the considerable delay in the departure of the Erebus and the uncertainty about her eventual role. 161 In White's judgment the report made by Stubbs to Whitehorn directly led to the transfer of the South African detachment ashore. He emphasised strongly that: the S.A. detachment troops were to all appearances very smart, keen and efficient and … we, that is the R.N. personnel, regretted very much their removal from the ship ... there was unrest due to inaction and uncertainty but no suggestion of mutiny. The S.A. detachment left on the best of terms ... 162 Beyers was of the opinion that White's evidence 'directly affect[ed]' the report he had submitted to the Adjutant General in December 1939. 163 As a matter of fact, it seems as if White's testimony was just what Defence Headquarters had been waiting for to sweep the whole uncomfortable affair under the carpet. It was a convenient, 'politically correct' report of the event that made it look insignificant, with no real transgression or failure on anybody's (except Finlayson's) part. Consequently nobody was prosecuted 164 and the possibility of domestic or BritishSouth African political embarrassment nicely avoided.
Conclusion
The Erebus scheme was born from close Anglo-South African relations within the Commonwealth defence system, but it was not grounded in a common appreciation of Cape Town harbour's defence requirements. The scheme was conceived militarily through Pirow's desire to make Cape Town harbour 'battleship proof' in the face of a possible Japanese threat, and politically through Great Britain's caution not to antagonise the Union government -even though she regarded the employment of 15-inch guns at the Cape an over-insurance. Strained British-South African relations at the lowest level (ship's company) clearly contributed to the removal of the First Detachment from the Erebus, but it was by no means the only cause; pay problems, uncertainty about their legal position and their date of departure perhaps played an equally important role in the whole affair. Moreover, the unrest and low morale did not affect the entire First Detachment, nor did it approach a state of mutiny and there was no need for them to have been put ashore. That radical step resulted from a complete mishandling of the situation by the South African officers, particularly Stubbs.
The removal of the First Detachment from the Erebus played no role in the decision to abort the Erebus scheme; the reason for its termination lies at the higher political level. When Churchill cabled Smuts on 20 September 1939 that Britain would be grateful if the Royal Navy could retain the Erebus, the events of 19 September had not yet been investigated and there is no indication that Smuts had been informed about it yet. The change of government in the Union brought a different view of Cape Town harbour's defence needs. Unlike Pirow, Smuts agreed with the British on the practical irrelevance of 15-inch guns for the Cape defences and consequently readily agreed to re-transfer the Erebus to the Admiralty. Getting rid of a perceived white elephant also offered Smuts the additional spin-off of 164.
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